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Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between corporate performance and the Chief Executive Officer compensation in high-
technology firms in the S&P 1500. The total CEO compensation and short and long-term compensations were tested regarding 
corporate performance. A panel data SUR model is estimated and describes the total compensation and cash compensation as a 
proportion of total pay for the period between 2000 and 2010 in high-technologies firms. The findings indicate that there is a 
strong and positive relation between CEO compensation and firm performance. This econometric study provides a better 
understanding on the relationship between CEO compensation and performance in high-technologies firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Chief Executive Officer compensation became common in the late 1970s and early 1980s and is often discussed 
in the literature ever since. Following the financial crises over the world, numerous stories have appeared in the 
recent financial press pointing out how many executives define our contracts remuneration. These news and striking 
reports have raised concerns on compensation. Nevertheless, in fact no consensus view has emerged, and there is 
still much to learn about the determinants of CEO compensation in firms and particularly in high-technology firms.  
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In high-technology firms it is possible to find innovation, R&D investments and some assets with essential 
competitive advantage and there are, at the same time, some risks. Different R&D spending in the firms is indicative 
of a large variance in the firms’ performance. High-tech investment is particularly important because the returns on 
high-tech investment are skewed and highly uncertain, in part because R&D projects have a low probability to 
succeed financially. Another reason is the existing asymmetry in information shared between firms and potential 
investors. This happens because it is difficult to increase high-tech investments and often insiders will have much 
better information than outsiders about the prospects of the firm's investments. The high-tech investments often have 
limited value R&D investment, which is predominantly salary payments (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). For these 
reasons, and because this subject is pertinent, it is interesting to examine these issues and contribute to the 
enrichment of research in this area, improving the understanding on CEO compensation. 
Moreover, as pointed out by Makri, Lane & Gomez-Mejia (2006) to engage in innovative projects leading to 
innovations, the incentive schemes play a pivotal role in inducing senior organizational managers. Furthermore, to 
secure the stream of innovations a firm needs to enhance its economic performance with a proper pay scheme to 
encourage executives (Makri, Lane, & Gomez-Mejia, 2006). Appropriate incentives can be the tools in many cases, 
however, by basing compensation on changes in shareholder wealth. According to Graham (2012), managers often 
have better information than shareholders and boards in terms of identifying investment opportunities and assessing 
the profitability of potential projects. Furthermore, the fact that managers are expected to make higher investment 
decisions explains why shareholders relinquish decision rights over their assets by purchasing common stock 
(Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2012). 
This study explores the performance determinants of CEO pays for long-term and short-term periods and points 
out the influence and behavior of high-tech firms. This work also attempts to examine the systematic difference in 
CEO pays and the performance expectations of high-tech firms and other firms. Furthermore, this paper examines 
how high-tech firms behave facing the cash based compensations and total CEO pays related to various performance 
measurements. The performance measurements pointed in this works are usually the accounting ratios of corporate 
finance, such as assets and the assets growth, sales, operating income before depreciation, the net income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations, earning per share and common equity. This paper contributes to 
the under-studied empirical literature on executive compensation for high-tech firms. 
The study by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2000) was taken into consideration in this paper, especially how they conclude 
that high-technology industry executives may be more rewarded for innovation activity than for financial firm 
performance. The executive incentives induce higher risk and cannot bear the financial risk associated as a 
consequence of those actions (Gomez-Mejia, Gideon, & Balkin, 2000). 
In 1990, Jensen and Murphy wrote that it is possible that CEO bonuses are strongly tied to an unexamined and/or 
unobservable measurement of performance. When they refer to the swings in CEO pay from year to year, they 
explain that the large swings are consistent with the existence of an overlooked and yet important performance 
measurement, and that that increase suggests that CEO pay is essentially unrelated to all relevant performance 
measurements (Murphy, 1999; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Jensen & Murphy, 1990b). 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between the CEO pay and the performance against high-
technologies firms with the balance cash compensation and total compensation. The combination of salary, 
incentives and bonuses is often referred to as cash compensation for executives. The CEO behavior is different when 
we think in short-term and long-term periods. The main goal of this paper is to provide a broader perspective on the 
relationship between CEO pay and firm performance and on how high-technology can improve that performance.  
This work is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a revision of the main theories in the literature, as well as 
an analysis on executive compensation in order to address agency problems. Furthermore, this section provides an 
analysis which examines the appropriate measurements for corporate financial performance in high-technology 
firms. Section 3, explains the research hypotheses and section 4 presents the methodology, sample and data 
collection for the regression estimation, as well as the results of the econometric model to assess the influence that 
firm performance has on executive compensation. Lastly, the main conclusions are discussed, as well as some 
limitations and new perspectives for future research. 
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2. Executive compensations to address agency problems  
The general acceptance of the agency theory and the parallel research on executive compensation began in the 
early 1980s. It was the evolution of the modern corporation with ownership separation and control that undermined 
the agency theory.  Early studies in this area focused on documenting the relation between CEO pay and firm 
performance. The discussion of executive compensation must proceed with the fundamental agency problem 
afflicting management decision-making as background. According to Jensen and Murphy (1990), there are two 
approaches to agency problems. The authors state that there is an optimal contracting approach, which is when 
boards use design compensation schemes to maximize shareholder value with efficient incentives (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990). To connect the agency problem and the executive compensation, the authors use the managerial 
power approach, when this connection is seen as an integral part of the agency problems. It is important to 
remember that the principal-agent problems treat the difficulties that arise under conditions where information is 
incomplete and asymmetric whenever a principal hires an agent (Murphy, 1999; Eisenhardt, 1989; Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2003). Furthermore, the agency theory aims at solving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. 
The first is the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to 
verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem is that the principal is unable to check if the agent has behaved 
correctly. Secondly, it is the problem of risk sharing facing the different attitudes toward risk, because the principal 
and the agent have different actions according to different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Hall and Lienbman (1998) argue that the solution to the agency problem is aligning the incentives of executives 
with the interests of shareholders by granting (or selling) stock and stock options to the CEOs. The CEOs have the 
correct incentives on every margin, including effort, perquisites and project choice, and support that the optimal 
contract is a one-to-one correspondence between firm value and CEO pay (Hall & Liebman, 1998). It is reasonable 
for small firms but it is not appropriate for large firms because optimal contracts represent a trade-off between 
incentives and risk-sharing (Eisenhardt, 1989). In their work Hall and Lienbman (1998) conclude that the 
relationship between pay and performance is much larger than has previously been recognized, and that this includes 
both gains and losses in CEO wealth. The salary and bonus vary so little because corporate board members are often 
reluctant to reduce CEO pay, even in response to poor performance and that may attract unwanted media attention. 
Using salary and bonuses to reward and penalize CEOs may only be possible to create high-powered incentives that 
align CEO pay with shareholder objectives (Hall & Liebman, 1998). A large part of the executive pay literature 
argues that compensation and managerial interests should be aligned with shareholder interests in order to solve 
agency problems (see, for example, the surveys by (Murphy, 1999) and by (Core, Guay, & Verrecchia, 2003a)). 
Some authors see the weakness of shareholder rights more generally and warn shareholders and their advisers to 
focus on the corporate governance provisions that really matter for the firm’s value (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 
2009, Cremers & Nair, 2005). Others assume CEOs to be more powerful when they serve as chair of the board, 
when they are the only member of the board, and when they have the status of a founder (Adams, Almeida, & 
Ferreira, 2005). 
Managers in high-technology firms have different goals than others sectors managers, such as managing 
intangible assets, continuous improvement, and software and product development. As a result, they must 
continuously innovate and sustain growth in an increasingly competitive and global market (Shim, Lee, & Joo, 
2009). 
2.1. Appropriate measurements of corporate financial performance in high-technology firms 
This chapter provides an analysis on the different forms of measuring the firm’s performance and how these 
engage to the level of CEO pay. The behavior of high-tech firms and its contribution to CEO compensation for the 
short and long-term are also analyzed. Shim (2009) argues that it is possible to confirm that the success of high-tech 
firms depends more on managing intangible assets. Some of these assets are technology innovation, continuous 
improvement, software development and knowledge-based management. High-tech firms must continuously 
innovate to survive and to sustain their growth (Shim, Lee, & Joo, 2009). 
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Equity-based compensation is widely documented in the research examining pay versus performance (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Murphy (2003) and Jensen (2004) state that the increase in stock options pay is the result of the 
boards’ inability to evaluate the true cost of this form of compensation. The use of equity-based compensation is 
encouraged by all stakeholders, such as investors, regulators and academics. The controversy over CEO 
compensation reflects a perception that CEOs effectively set their own pay levels. In most companies, the last 
decisions over executive pay are made by members outside the board of directors who are keenly aware of the 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders over the level of pay. However, the CEOs and other top 
managers exert at least some influence on the level and on the structure of their pay (Murphy, 1999). 
In recent years, the use of restricted stocks in compensation executives has increased and has been widely 
criticized when these executives received dividend equivalents on restricted stocks before the vesting period. 
Agency cost benefits of dividend equivalent rights argue that this practice helps executives focus on the business, 
and rewards them for managing the business to produce cash. Therefore, this is encouraged because it is a way of 
distributing dividends by shareholders (Akpotaire, 2011).  
Restricted stock awards are profitable for executives because the income tax consequences can be more favorable 
to employees than stock options. The special case of the USA and the consequences of a restricted stock mean that 
in some cases the award can be structured to allow for the deferral of all tax until the time of the stock sale, and for 
all appreciation to be taxed at capital gain rates, even if the stock is appreciated prior to vesting. In contrast, stock 
options can result in ordinary income to the recipient the stock has appreciated prior to vesting, with only the post-
exercise appreciation deferred to the time of sale at capital gains rates. Furthermore, the preferred stock usually 
carries no voting rights but may carry a dividend and may have priority over common stock in the payment of 
dividends and upon liquidation. The preferred share investor is entitled to a preset rate of dividend that must be paid 
out of earnings before any dividends are distributed to common shareholders. These dividends receive favorable tax 
treatment relatively to other forms of income. 
Earnings per share (EPS) are a popular performance metric used in executive compensation contracts (Murphy 
1999, 2000). As it is commonly known, this ratio is influenced and directly punished by the increase in restricted 
stocks and dividend equivalents. Compensation contracts that tie managerial rewards to EPS create explicit 
incentives for executives to manage the EPS. Young and Jing (2011) argue that there is a net benefit to shareholders 
in executive compensation contracts when they use stock repurchases by EPS targets (Young & Jing, 2011). 
Additionally, if stock options are a sub-optimal incentive contract, Sesil et al. (2006) expect that, in terms of  firm 
performance, there will be a decrease in earnings or an increase in earnings with a reduction in the rate of return on 
assets (Sesil, Lin, & Steven, 2006). 
The use of options at the executive level associated with an increase in performance is not clear in the literature. 
Some argue that it is associated with a higher profit and output (Core et al., 2003a), while others state the opposite 
(Hall & Murphy, 2003). The use of stock options reduces the agency cost and incentive to maximize value creation 
for shareholders, and encourages risk taking, then accounting is shown by measuring corporate finance (Sesil, Lin, 
& Steven, 2006). They argue that adopting stock options has an impact on firm financial performance to increase 
operating income (OI) and investments in assets. However, there will be a significant decrease in return on assets 
(ROA). Others who have done previous research on stock options have focused on pay-for-performance elasticity 
(Hall & Murphy, 2003), while others have focused more on the determinants of share-based adoption (Core, Guay, 
& Verrecchia, 2003a). The adoption of stock options is associated to higher growth in income, but to significantly 
lower return on assets (ROA), which is evidence that options promote sub-optimal over investment. 
The company’s measurements are consistent with vision, mission and strategies for long-term performance and 
the financial criteria to monitor CEO compensation (Epstein & Roy, 2005). Usually in the USA, the compensation 
programs combine incentives for short and long-term periods with a set of performance measurements.  
In summary, it was found that firms are subjected to the agency problem in which the CEO may not work in 
favor of the shareholders to maximize their wealth by improving firm performance. Furthermore, the decisions 
related to CEO compensation are based on the firms’ accounting and finance performance. Therefore, it is theorized 
that CEO compensation according to firm performance using variables such as assets, return on assets, sales growth, 
operating income before depression and earning per share suited the high-technology firms, as presented above. 
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3. Research hypotheses  
Some possibilities have been identified to find some relations with pay compensation and to understand how it is 
possible to improve firm performance and in turn the shareholder wealth. As previously discussed, existing theories 
provide predictions on the outlined considerations related to firm performance, allowing for two different selection 
hypotheses.  
The first research question will be: The CEO compensation for the long-term is determinant and positively 
correlated with firm performance. High-technology companies support and enhance this evidence.  Rejecting the 
null hypothesis would mean that the relative weight in terms of total compensation of each compensation component 
(such as salary, bonus, stock options and other compensations) are different goals for executives, as opposed to 
performance for the short-term. It is possible that high value firms have CEOs interested in long-term performance 
and in obtaining personal benefits in terms of total compensation. It might be argued that powerful incentive models 
are especially valuable for high value firms with high opportunities for growth that need to be decisively and 
vigorously pursued. It might also be that high value firms are especially likely to attract star CEOs and pay gold 
parachutes. The second question will be: The CEO compensation for the short-term is determinant and positively 
correlated with firm performance. With less intensity and yet more persistent than long-term compensation, bonuses 
and salary are determinant and in the same effect related to accounting performance. 
4. Methodology, sample and data collection 
The chosen database was the ExecuComp, which was used to find the variables and to create a sample of firms 
between 2000 and 2010. The ExecuComp database provides yearly data on salary, bonus, stock option and restricted 
stock grants, as well as managerial stock and option holdings for top executives in firms within the Standard & 
Poor’s Index (S&P 1500). To test this hypothesis, the following specification is run on the balanced panel of high-
technology firms. High-Technology firms are the firms that operate in an industry with a four-digit SIC code of 
3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372, or 7373,  using the Fama and 
French classification of 48 industry groups, instead of four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
(Fama & French, 1997). According to Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2011), in order to test the variables and to 
assess the abovementioned research hypotheses there are independent variables that will possibly be used by the 
regression model to perform the estimation. The total compensation is analyzed depending on some firm 
performance metrics.  
At an empirical level, this analysis focuses on a sample of 1500 high-tech companies in the Standard & Poor's 
(stock market index based on the common stock prices) index (S&P1500), for the period between 2000 and 2010, 
which constitutes a sample of 15265 observations. The ExecuComp database collects information on seven 
independent variables – Total assets (ASSETS) and percentage change of assets (ASSETSCHG), total annual net 
sales (SALES), operating income before depreciation (OIBD), net income before extraordinary items (NIBEX), 
earning per share (EPSEX), return on assets (ROA) – and independent total compensation (TOTAL_COMP) and 
cash compensation (CASH) variables are listed by each year and company. Several measurements were used in this 
study, such as control variables. These include assets, increase in sales, the net Income and the earning per share, as 
a proxy of firm size, firm performance and shareholder wealth, the common predictors of executive pay. The two 
primary measurements of CEO pay were used. The short-term compensation consisted of annual salary and bonus, 
which represents the total cash compensation received during a specific year. Annual salary and bonus for 2000 and 
2010 (in thousands of dollars) were taken from the ExecuComp data set. The long-term compensation represents the 
equity-based compensation of a CEO, as reported by Frydman (2008). As she reported in the case study of General 
Electric, salary and bonus are defined as the level of salaries and current bonuses, both awarded and paid out during 
the year. Long-term bonus measures the amount paid out during the year according to long-term bonuses awarded in 
prior years. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term bonus and the Black–Scholes value of stock 
options granted (Frydman, 2009).  
The table below identifies the variables that were used, including their definitions, measurement units and the 
expected signs, as reported by the theory. 
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Ln (TOTAL_COMP) (+) Ln (the sum of the compensations of top executives includes: Salary, 
Bonus, Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Grant-Date Fair Value of 
Option Awards, Grant-Date Fair Value of Stock Awards, Deferred 
Compensation Earnings Reported as Compensation, and Other 
Compensations). 
Thousands 
Ln(CASH) (+) Ln (SALARY + Bonus) The dollar value of the base salary plus bonus 
earned by the named executive officer during the fiscal year. 
Thousands 
Ln (ASSETS)  (+) Ln (the Total Assets as reported by the company). Millions 
ASSETCHG (+) The year to year percentage change in Total Assets. Percentage 
ROA (+) The Net Income Before Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations 
divided by Total Assets. This quotient is then multiplied by 100. 
Percentage 
Ln(COMMEQ) (+) The sum of Common Stock, Capital Surplus, Retained Earnings, and 
Treasury Stock adjustments. 
Millions 
EPSEX  (–) Earnings per Share (Primary) Excluding Extraordinary Items and 
Discontinued Operations. 
 
(OIBD/ASSETS)*100 (+) Ln (the Operating Income Before Depreciation as reported by the 
company/Assets).This quotient is then multiplied by 100. 
Percentage 
Ln(NIBEX)  (+) Ln (the Net Income Before Extraordinary Items and Discontinued 
Operations). 
Millions 
Ln(SALES) (+) Ln (The Net Annual Sales as reported by the company). Millions 
SIC  Standard Industrial Classification Code.  
SPCODE (+) and (–) Current S&P Index membership 
"SP" = S&P 500 
"MD" = S&P Midcap Index 
"SM" = S&P Small cap Index 
"EX" = not on a major S&P Index 
  
The High-Tech Dummy (DHTECH) is equal to one if the firm operates in an industry with a four-digit SIC code 
of 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372, or 7373, instead of four-
digit SIC codes (Fama & French, 1997). Other dummy variables are used, YEAR for the period between 2001 and 
2010. The main variables of the analysis in the system equation are T_COMP (defined by the sum of Salary, Bonus, 
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Grant-Date Fair Value of Option Awards, Grant-Date Fair Value of 
Stock Awards, Deferred Compensation Earnings Reported as Compensation and Other Compensations) and CASH 
(Salary plus bonus) of all top executives in each company.  
Table 2, presents the descriptive statistics of the observed variables. Some interesting outcomes were found as a 
result of this study.  




CASH ROA NIBEX EPSEX SALES 
ASSET 
CHG 
ASSETS COMMEQ OIBD 
DHT 
ECH 
 Mean  13727.19  4156.375  1.577071  288.9755  3.470422  5488.187  39.96929  15205.21  2714.774  1000.633  0.144150 
 Median  8089.794  2937.509  3.874000  58.40650  1.200000  1239.655  6.034000  1746.966  637.0890  176.3185  0.000000 
 Maximum  641446.2  199115.9  3551.351  45220.00  8548.000  425071.0  522050.0  3221972.  211686.0  124840.0  1.000000 
 Minimum  0.000000  0.000000 -10300.00 -99289.00 -231.670 -4,234.47 -99.4270  0.000000 -111403.0 -76735.00  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  20478.12  5100.741  82.64384  2018.437  113.8698  16956.91  3705.640  88055.59  9044.259  3833.163  0.351251 
 Skewness  8.7409  9.9984 -94.4612 -9.3868  55.3268  10.6209  140.8027  15.88214  8.802576  9.601327  2.026239 
 Observ  19678  19889  19869  19870  19842  19870  19855  19872  19872  19606  19889 
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The descriptive statistics of the variables for total CEO compensation for high-tech firms are presented in 
Table 2. In the S&P1500, in the period between 2000 and 2010, there are about 14.415% high-technology firms, and 
it is possible to observe that the group of top executives in each company has an average total compensation around 
USD 13,727 million and earn in cash around USD 4.156 million. Other interesting finding is that, in this period and 
in this group of companies, there is an increase in assets and returns on assets around 39.96% and 1.57%, 
respectively. 
The models introduced by the system equation presented below were used to test whether firm performance is 
relevant to explain executive compensation for the long and short-term. Firstly, the model for the long-term, 
Ln (T_COMP)ij = b11+ b12*ln(ASSETS) ij + b13*ASSETCHG ij + b14*ROAij+b15*ln(OIBD/ASSETS*100)ij+ 




j*Yearj+ ∂∑ .  +  uij (1) 
and for the short-term 
Ln (CASH)ij = b21+ b22*log(ASSETS) ij + b23*ASSETCHG ij + b24*ROA ij + b25*ln(OIBD/ASSETS*100)ij + 
b26*ln(SALES) ij +b27*ln(NIBEX)ij + b29*SPCODE ij + b20*DHTECH ij+ b32*ln(COMMEQ)ij+ 
2010
2001
j*Yearj∂∑  + vij  (2) 
where, i and j represent the year and the company, respectively. The coefficients b11 and b21 are constants denoting 
the base level from which the sum of the compensations of top executive varies according to the changes in 
performance variables. 
The panel data model is used because it is the most suitable way of studying a large set of repeated observations 
and due to the fact that it assesses evolution over time. With panel data it is possible to simultaneously explore 
several variations over time and between different individuals. The use of such models has increased immensely 
and, in fact, combining time and cross-sectional data brings many advantages: it is possible to use a larger number 
of observations and the degree of freedom in estimates increases, thus making statistical inferences more credible. 
At the same time, the risk of multicollinearity is reduced since the data in companies present different structures. 
Moreover, this model provides access to further information and the efficiency and stability of the estimators 
increase, while enabling the introduction of dynamic adjustments (Green, 2002; Gujarati, 2000). 
The system equation presented was estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. The 
SUR is a generalization of a linear regression model that consists of several regression equations, each having its 
own dependent variable and potentially different sets of exogenous explanatory variables. The main motivations for 
using the SUR are: improving estimation efficiency by combining information on different equations; and imposing 
and testing restrictions that involve parameters in different equations. The model can be estimated to each equation 
considering the interdependence of distribution (SUR). The SUR model can be further generalized into the multiple 
regressions, where the regressor on the right-hand side can also function as endogenous variables. The multiple-
equation model is a system of equations where the assumptions made for the single-equation model apply to each 
equation. The regression coefficient, year, does not vary over time because the estimation was conducted using 
dummy variables for year, and assuming that the company’s heterogeneity is captured in the constant part (Greene 
& William, 2002).  
The first hypothesis for the positive influence of CEO compensation on firm performance is presented in 
appendix Table 3. As it is possible to observe the regressions are globally significant, with a 5% significance level. 
The following table presents the results of the estimation for the studied data. 
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Table 3. Results of the total compensation and cash compensation estimations using the SUR method (regressions with SIC code dummy 
(DHTECH) for high-technology companies – econometric models) 
Ln (TOTAL_COMP) Coefficient Prob.   Ln (CASH) Coefficient Prob.   
constant 6,022018 0.0000 constant 5.941700 0.0000 
Ln(ASSETS) 0.072140 0.0000 Ln(ASSETS) 0.123158 0.0000 
ASSETCHG 0.001383 0.0000 ASSETCHG 0.000403 0.0000 
ROA 0.000859 0.1045 ROA 0.000798 0.0385 
OIBD/ASSETS*100 0.007541 0.0000 OIBD/ASSETS*100 0.003945 0.0000 
Ln(SALES) 0.143398 0.0000 Ln(SALES) 0.135561 0.0000 
Ln(NIBEX) 0.111439 0.0000 Ln(NIBEX) 0.053986 0.0000 
EPSEX -0.000400 0.0000 -   
SPCODE=SP 0.057757 0.0001 SPCODE=SP -0.046676 0.0000 
SPCODE=SM -0.167486 0.0000 SPCODE=SM -0.016045 0.1047 
DHTECH 0.313173 0.0000 DHTECH 0.011091 0.3353 
Ln (COMMEQ) 0.112421 0.0000 -   
2001 0.010864 0.6572 2001 -0.028642 0.1061 
2002 -0.045589 0.0611 2002 0.051824 0.0033 
2003 -0.051240 0.0290 2003 0.107735 0.0000 
2004 0.021421 0.3570 2004 0.152258 0.0000 
2005 0.018350 0.4379 2005 0.134210 0.0000 
2006 -0.007390 0.7480 2006 -0.242996 0.0000 
2007 0.045311 0.0495 2007 -0.306410 0.0000 
2008 0.051967 0.0328 2008 -0.301458 0.0000 
2009 0.044238 0.0698 2009 -0.283819 0.0000 
2010 0.151203 0.0000 2010 -0.304708 0.0000 
R-squared 0.565742  R-squared 0.547052  
Adjusted R-squared 0.565137  Adjusted R-squared 0.546487  
S.E. of regression 0.624388  S.E. of regression 0.455708  
Durbin-Watson stat 0.950250  Durbin-Watson stat 0.682381  
 
The statistics are computed based on a panel data set of 1500 firm-year observations, a total of about 15625 
companies that represent 14.415% of high-technology firms between 2000 and 2010, and represent around 31.31% 
in long-term compensation. Other financial performance measurements such as total assets, operating income before 
depreciation, net income before Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations, growth sales, as reported by this 
sample, are positive and significantly related to total executive and cash compensations. It is important to highlight 
that around 56.57% (R2 = 0.5657) and 54.7% (R2 = 0.547) of the variance in degree of CEO compensation for each 
equation, respectively, can be explained by the group of variables (see Table 3). These indicate that variables 
addressed here play a significant role in explaining executive compensation for short and long-term periods as stated 
by Chi-Square test (p-value = 0). 
In the table 3, the coefficient signs are similar in both specifications. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients 
are sensitive to the specification. As expected, earnings per share are negative and significantly related to total 
compensation for the long-term. This indicates that there are no explicit contractual arrangements linking 
compensations and earnings per share. The performance ratio of firms measured by return has a negative influence 
on CEO Compensation (Young & Jing, 2011, Core, Guay, & Verrecchia, 2003a). 
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A positive and statistically significant relationship was found between sales, asset growth and return on assets 
and for adding the same level of total CEO compensation and cash compensation (Gabaix & Landier, 2008) also 
empirically test the relation between the level of pay and firm size. Log (assets), a variable proxy for firm size is 
positively related to pay with a coefficient total compensation and cash compensation in the regression. When the 
adjustment is performed for the long-term compensation, it is possible to understand that when firm sizes are 
compared using the denominated current S&P index membership, S&P500 firms have an increase around 5.7% and 
for the S&P small caps 600 there is a decrease around 16.7%, comparatively to the S&P Midcaps 400 firms. In 
terms of cash compensation, the S&P 500 firms are 4.7% below midcaps, and the S&P small caps 600 firms are 
1.6% below, comparatively to the same group of S&P Midcaps 400 firms. Another finding is that the influences on 
CEO pay for the short-term between the year 2006 and 2008does not have the same meaning in long-term 
compensations. There is an increase around 5% for each year between 2007 and 2010, as opposed to the year 
2000.Furthermore, there is a decrease of about 30% in short-term incentives for the same period comparatively to 
the year 2000, which was possibly influenced by the beginning of the financial crisis, and it is not reflected in the 
long-term incentives. As Henry et al. (2011) suggest, CEO compensation increases the probability of effective 
internal controls after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Henry, Shon, & Weiss, 2011). Moreover, as expected, the 
increase in financial performance measurements such as operating income before depreciation/assets and net income 
have a double impact on the increase in long-term compensation that is more positive than the increase in short-term 
compensations. 
5. Conclusion and future research 
This paper will contribute to a better understanding on the relationship between compensation and performance 
in high-technology firms, something which is often discussed in the literature. The main purpose of this study was to 
examine whether the total compensation paid to CEOs in high-technology firms in the S&P 1500 is related in 
corporate finance. This work aims at contributing to explain the influence that performance has on CEO 
compensation for short and long-term periods in these group of companies. It was found that there is a strong and 
positive relation between CEO compensation and firm performance. 
In conclusion, according to the results that were obtained there is empirical evidence to state that high-technology 
firms in the S&P1500, during the period between 2000 and 2010, have contributed to increases in total CEO 
compensation for short and long-term periods, together with accruals of financial performance measurements. 
Results suggest that high-tech firms tend to use more sophisticated performance measurements to determine CEO 
compensation. The method use here has potential implications in finance and accounting, for instance, where it is 
preferable to separately capture the specific effects of firm and performance. 
However, this work is not without limitations. This study focuses only on high-technology firms in the S&P 1500 
in the period between 2000 and 2010. The definition of high-technology used in this study can be extended as 
performed by Shim et al. (2009), and other important item measurements should be included, such as value of R&D 
expenditures, number of patents by firm and citation of patents (Gomez-Mejia, Gideon, & Balkin,  2000; Shim, Lee, 
& Joo, 2009). The level of R&D expenditures and new product introductions are viewed as proxies for innovation, 
risk-taking and long-term decision-making, which are crucial to characterize high-technology firms. Furthermore, 
innovation constitutes an indispensable component of corporate strategies. For these reasons, the results of this study 
may not be generalized by other sectors due the specificity of the high-tech firms. 
In the future, it will be important to analyze other developments, such as the effect of managerial attributes for 
the short and long-term in executive compensation (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2012). Furthermore, it will also be 
important to desegregate the data sample for the period between 2000 and 2010 in order to broaden the period of 
analysis and to investigate the effect of the USA financial crisis, which started in 2007, and to understand the 
effectiveness of internal control structures under Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX, Section 404) before and after 
implementation. 
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